We show how to transform any interactive proof system which is atatisticnl zero-knowledge with respect to the honest-verifier, into a proof system which is statistical zero-knowledgewith respectto any vcdflcr, This is done by limiting the behavior of potentially cheatinG VcrilIer~, without 44sirrg computational assumptions or even refirring lo lhe complexity of suclr verijerstrafegies. (Previous transformations hnveeitherrelied oncomputationalassumptionsorwere npplicnblc only to constant-round public-coin proof systems.)
Introduction
Zero-Knowledge proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali andliackoff[GMR89] , are fascinatingandextremelyusefulconstmcts. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory nature; they arc both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the nsscrtion being proven. Their applicability in the domain of cryptogrnphy is vast; they are typically used to force malicious pnrtieo to behnve according to a predetermined protocol (which requires pnrtics to provide proofs of the correctness of their secretbaaed nctions without revealing these secrets).
Zero-knowledge proofs come in many flavors. Arguably, the most important parameters refer to the strength of the zero-knowledge (or simulability) condition. These are captured by two parameters: The first parameter is the type of adversary which is supposed to Amit Sahait Salil Vadhant learn nothing while verifying an assertion. The simplest type is a honest-verifier; that is, one which follows the protocol (and ends up with the transcript of the interaction). Zero-knowledge with respect to an honest-verifier is already a fascinating notion from a conceptual as well as a complexity-theoretic point of view. However, cryptographic applications typically require robustness against arbitrary (or arbitrary feasible) behavior which typically deviates from the protocol. This is thegeneral(or standard) notion ofzero-knowledge. A major open problem in the area is whether honesr-verijerzeroknowledge equals general zero-knowledge. A positive answer to this question may also lead the way to a useful methodology: First construct a honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof to the problem at hand, and next transform it to a general zero-knowledge proof. To describe our contribution to the above open problem. we need first to discuss a second major parameter of the zero-knowledge framework -the notion of learning nothing.
The requirement that the verifier learns nothing from the proof is formulated by saying that the transcript of its interaction with the prover can be simulated by the verifier itself. That is, there exists an efficient procedure than on input a valid assertion produces a distribution which is "similar" to the distribution of transcripts of the executions of the proof system on that assertion. The key parameter is the interpretation of "similarity". Three notions have been commonly considered in the literature (cf., [GMR89, For89] ). Perfect Zero-Knowledge (PZK) requires that the two distributions be identical. StatisticalZero-Knowledge (SIX) requires that these distributions be statistically close (i.e., the variation distance between themisnegligible). Finally,ComputationalZero-Knowledge(CZK) refers to the case that these distributions are computationally indistinguishable (cf., [GM84, Yao82] ).
Assumingthe existenceof one-way functions. any language which has anintemctive proof, has also a Computational Zero-Knowledge one(cf., [GMW91,IY87,BGG+ 881). Thus, assumingtheexistence of one-way functions, the above problem (i.e., of honest-verifierZK versus general ZK) is long resolved for the case of Computational Zero-Knowledge. Still, it is open whetherone can prove that honestverifier CZK equals general CZK, without assuming the existence of one-way functions. We resolve this problem for the special case of public-coin (aka Arthur-Merlin) proof systemsTheorem 1 Every language having an Honest-Verifier Computational Zero-Knowledgepublic-coin proofqstem, also has a general Computational Zero-Knowledge (public-coin)proof system. We note that it is known that the existence of honest-verifier CZK for languages outsideBPP yields a weak form of one-way functions [OW93] . However, this weak form of one-way functions does NOT seem to suffice for constructing general CZK proofs for the same language (in general).
The main focus of this paper is the honest-verifier versusgeneml verifier problem for Srurisricu6 Zero-Knowledge. We fully resolve the problem in this caseTheorem 2 Every language having an Honest-lkriJ7er Statistical Zero-Knowledgeproofsystem, also &~a general (public-coin) Stutistical Zero-Kno~vledgeproo~ Results of similar nature were previously achievedunder intmctability assumptions (cf., [BM090, OVY93, Oka96] ). A weakerunconditional result was claimed in [DOY97] . All these are discussedin detail below. But first we need to be somewhat more precise about the notions and issues discussed above.
Formal Setting
The basic notions of interactive proofs [GMRS9] are recalled in Ap pcndix A. Throughout this subsection we fix a language L, and an interactive proof system, (P, V), for it.' The basic paradigmof zeroknowledge is that for every verifier of a certain class, there should be an efficient non-interactive machine, called the simulator, which is able to "simulate well" the view of the verifier in real interactions with the prescribed prover (i.e., P). The two main issues we consider are (1) which verifiers should be simulated, and (2) the quality of simulation.
Which verifiers should be simulated (or honest-verifier versus general zero-knowledge):
Thetwo standardclassesarethe class consisting merely of the prescribed verifier V (aka the honestverifier), and the class consisting of all probabilistic polynomialtime interactive machines (i.e., feasible cheating strategies for the Wifier).
For the case of statistical zero-knowledge,we will considereven a wider (in fact the widest possible) class -the class of all possible verifier strategies (including non-computable ones). This will make our result even stronger. But how can an efficient machine (i.e., the simulator) simulate the behavior (Iet alone interaction) of a non-computable verifier strategy? The clue is the familiar notion of a reduction, captured in this contest by the notion of a blnck-box simulator. The latter is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine which is given oracle access to the verifier strategy.2 Vie comment that the notion of black-box simulation was considered before for other reasons (cf., [GO94, GK961).
The quality of simulation (or SZK versus CZK): When defining statistical zero-knowledge (w.r.t. a class of verifiers), one requires that for every verifier, I'*, in the class there esists an efficient simulator, S', such that the following two distribution ensembles are statistically close (i.e., the variation distance is eventually smaller than l/p(Jzl) for every positive polynomial p):
1. {(P, V*)(L) : z E L}, where (P, V*)(Z) denotes the view of I'* when interacting with P on common input 2. Recall that this view consists oft, all internal coin tosses of I/*, and all messages received from P.
{S.(x) : ZEL).
The variation distance behveen the hvo distribution ensembles is called the sbnrdatordeviation . In case there exists a black-box simulator, denoted S, the second distribution ensemble is {S"' (z) :
' AU ourrcsulu extend also to promise problems. a That is, assuming deterministic sate&s. each queay is parsed es a sequence of pro~crmesu~csrcpresentingapretixof theintmction,andtheanswerisIheresponse of this verifier strategy to such a prefix. Prob;ibilistic wilier strategies are considered by lirst randomly selecting and f&g n detemkistic strategy. and then proceeding as above.
z E L}, where Sv*(z) denotes the output distribution of S on input x and oracle access to V'.
When defining compufafional zero-knowledge (with respect to a class of verifiers), one instead requires that the two distributions aboveare computationally indistinguishable (cf., [GMS4, YaoE!]). That is, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, D, the following quantity is negligible (i.e., is eventually smaller than l/p(lel) for every polynomial p):
In our definitions of zero-knowledge, we require that the simulators run in strict polynomial-time, as in [Goll)S].
Notations:
Let HVSZX: (resp., SZIC) denote the class of languageshavingintemctiveproofswhicharestatisticalzero-knowledce with respect to the honest-verifier (resp., with respect to any probabilistic polynomial-time verifier). The classes 7fVC2li nnd C2h: are defined analogously for computational zero-lmowlcdge. Public-coin (or Arthur-Merlin) proof systems. As we refer to this notion, let us recall thatpublic-coinproofsysterns are interactive proof systems in which the prescribed verifier's strategy amounts to the following: In each round, the verifier tosses a prodetermined number of coins and sends the outcome to the prover, and at the end it decides whether to accept by applying a predicate to the (full) sequenceof messages it has sent and received. For each oftheclassesc above,wedenoteby& thesubclassofpttbkcoin (or Arthur-Merlin) proof systems having the corresponding zeroknowledge property.
Previous work
Clearly, SZX: C 7WSZK: (resp., C2X E WCZAJ, BPP C_ SZX: E CZX: (resp., HVSZk' C 7WC2~), and &at d C C ZP for each of these four ZK classes.
1.2.1 On the complexity of various ZK classes.
The situation with respect to computational ZK is as follows. Unconditional results for constant-round ZK: The only unconditional transformations of honest-vedfierSZK (resp., CZK) known before, referred to thcclass ofconsrunr-roundpublic-coinproofsysterns (cf, , [Dam94, DGW94] ), It was shown that if L has a HVSZK (reap,, HVCZK) public-coin proof system of a constant number of rounds then 1; E S21ClrM (resp., L E C2KjrM).
Wonk SZK: In [DOY97] it isclaimedthatanylanguagein3-IYSZX has an interactive proof, (P, V), with the following non-standard atntioticnl zero-knowledge property: For every positive polynomial p, nnd every probabilistic polynomial-time verifier V', there exists n probabilistic polynomial-time simulator SG (with nmning-timedepending on p) so that the variation distance between the probability enacmblca, {(P, V*)(z) : z E L} and {S;(z) : x E L), is at most 1MlW 1.3 Restating our results WC obtdn the first unconditional general transformation of honestvcrillcr zero-knowledge to general zero-knowledge.
Thcorcm 3 (main result): There exisrs an eflcient transformation ofHonest-WlJierStatistical (resp., Computational)Zero-Knowledge public-coinproofsysrems, into generufStutisticu1 (resp., Computational) Zero-Knowledge public-coin proof systems. Furthermore, I. The resulting proofsystems has twice as many rounds as the original one. 2, The resulting prover strategy can be implemented in probabilistic polynomail-time given oracle access to the original prover strategy. 3, The completeness error of the resulting proof ustern is exponentially vanishing. In case the originalproofsystemhasperfeet completeness, so does the resulting one.
e'fho flr~t nulhorwas unnbleto verifythecl;llmsandPrgumen(sSivenin [DOY97J.
4. The soundnesserrorof the resultingproofsysrem is bounded above by l/p( izl), wherep is an arbitra~*polynomial determined by the Wansfomtah'on. 5. The resulting proof system has a bhzck-box zero-knowledge sbnuhltor. 6. In case of Statistical Zero-Knowledge, the resulting simulator is strong (i.e., it can handle arbitrary venjiersrrategiesj, and its sbnuludon error is at most poly(lzl) -E(Z) + 2-*(trl), where c(x) is the simulation error of the original system.
Theorems 1 and2follow, wherein caseofStatisticalZero-Knowledge weuseOkamoto's result by which XYSZK: = 'HVSZK&., [Oka96, Thm. I].
We stress that, in contrast to the previously mentioned conditional results, ourresult for (unbounded)stutistical zero-knowledge is unconditional and guarantees (black-box) simulation of all possible verifier strategies (not only polynomial-time ones). Theorem 3 also provides a transformation for a wide class of computational zero-knowledgeproof systems-that is, the class ofpublic-coin proof systems. We view our result as a significant step towards showing that HVCZK: = CZK: without relying on any intractability assumptions.
Soundness error and number of rounds: The transformation of Theorem 3 increases the number of rounds of the original proof system only by a factor of 2. However, the resulting protocol has noticeable soundness error. That is, for any positive polynomial p, we can achieve a soundness error of I/p(lzl). The soundness error may be further decreased, while preserving the zero-knowledge property, by sequential repetition of the proof system. In particular, to achieve negligible soundness error it suffices to use w(l) sequential repetitions. This is unavoidable, unless n/P C BPP. since only BPP languages may have black-box simula&n zeroknowledge public-coin proofs with constant number of rounds and negligible error probability Many known results regarding the class 'HVSZK. translate to the class SZX: (and respectively results for HX2Kjr,1 translate to CZIcI&. For example, using known results regarding HVSZIG, one obtains that SZK: is closed under complement, equals SZKI~, has a complete promise problem. etc. A somewhat less straightforward corollary is the following.
Corollary 4 Every language in S2K has a SZKproofsystem with petj&zt completeness in which the soundness error and the sbnulation deviation are exponentially vanishing.
Given Theorem 3 (and the discussion above), the only non-obvious part in Corollary 4 is the claim about the simulation error. Here we rely on the result of [SV97] by which every language in 'HYSZK: has a I-round interactive proof system for which the honest-verifier can be simulated with exponentially vanishing simulation error. We also use a careful analysis of the 3tYSZK: to ZYS2Klna, transformation of [Oka96] by which this transformation increases the simuIation error by at most an exponentially vanishing amount. And lastly, applying Theorem 3, we use its item 6.
Techniques
Theorem 3 is proven by modifying the transformation presented in [DGW94] . Whereas the proof systems resulting from that transformation could be simulated only for a constant number of rounds, our modified transformation can be simulated for any (polynomial) number of rounds. Both transformations apply to honest-verifier Arthur-Merlin zero-knowledge proofs (both statistical and computational).
In thetransformation of [DGW94], each&bit long (random) message sent by Arthur is replaced by an invocation of a 2-round Random Selection protocol, for generating strings in (0, l}e. For any fixed positive polynomial p, a Random Selection protocol with the following two properties was presented pGW94]:
1. As long as Arthur plays according to the protocol, Merlin may cause the outcome to deviate from uniform distribution over (0, l}e by at most l/p(k). (That is, the variation distance is at most l/p(Q) 2. As long as Merlin plays according to the protocol, Arthur may not cause any E-bit string to appear as the outcome with probability greater than p(l)'>l -2-e. In particular, when Arthur applies a deterministic cheating strategy, the outcome of the protocolis uniformly distributedoversomeset of & strings.
The proof system resulting from the above transformation is simulated in lDGW94] by running the honest-verifier simulator, and hoping that all Arthur-messages included in the transcript fall in the sets mentioned in Item (2) above. If the proof system uses only a constant number of invocations of the Random Selection protocol, then the above suffices for producing a black-box simulation with respect to any cheating Arthur-strategy. This approach fails when we have a non-constant number of rounds (Random Selection invocations).
In this paper we modify the above transformation as follows. Rather than selecting a message, we use the Random Selectionprotocol to specify (in a succinct manner) a set of 2" messages. Merlin is then supposed to select a message for Arthur, uniformly from this set. An immediate concern is that this allows Merlin to select a string which is advantageous for cheating. However, this onIy increases Merlin's cheating probability by a factor of 2" per each round. (We can first make the original proof system have an even smaller soundness error, so this should not scare us.) So the question is what we gained by doing so. Intuitively, we gained not having to simulate the Random Selection protocol for any possible outcome. Rather than having to simulate an execution which results in any specific &bit output, (Y, we only need to simulate an execution which results in a random set of strings containing CY. The distinction is important since esecutions of the former type may exist only for a l/poly(e) fraction of the possible&, whereas-as we showexecutions of the latter type exists and can be efficiently generated for all but a 2-"(") fraction of the CY'S. Proving the last statement is a major technical undertaking of the paper. It is reduced to proving the following lemma which may be of independent interest: Lemma 5 (Hashing Lemma): Thereexistsauniversalconstant, c > 0, so that the following hola!s, for every e, 6 > 0. Let D and T be finite sets, H be a 2-universalfamily of hashjimctionsfiom D to T, and e E T. Let S C H such that ISI 2 SjHj, and X be a random variable ranging over afinite set D having collision probability at most fi (i.e., &n Pr [X = $1" < fi>. Then the statistical dtyerence behveen the following hvo randomprocesses is at most c. eltcP.
(A) Select h uniformly in S, and let z be selectedfiotn X conditioned on h(X) = e. Output (h, z), (B) Let x c X, and h be selected uniformly among all k E II sutisfjGng h(z) = e. Output (h, 2).
Actually, a special case of this lemma, where X is uniform over D (and IT/ = e -IDI> suffices for the current proof of Theorem 3. Thus, only a proof of this special case is given in this version. The stronger version was developed for an alternative proof, discovered first, which is totally superseded by the current proof.
Notation
Whenever we consider an interactive proof system, x will denote the common input and n will be the length of p. For notational convenience, we will often hide dependenceon z or n when it is clear. For example, we write T instead of r(n). If X and Y are random variables, we write IlX -Y II for their statistical difference (or variation distance), defined as IlS -1'11 = f(c, I Pr [X = Z] -Pr [y = $1 I). By t + X, we mean taking a sample x from random variable X. If S is a set a ER S indicates that x is chosen uniformly from S.
3 The starting proof system Theorem 3 is proven by combining two tmnsfonnations. The first transformation is obtained by parallel repetition, and is stated without proof below.5 The protocols resulting from this transformation are the starting point for our main transformation, stated in the nest section.
Lemma 3.1 Let L be a language having a honest-verifier statistical (resp., computational) zero-knowledge public-coin proof systents of r rounds. Then L has such a (T-round honest-verifier) zcroknowledge (public-coin) proof system in wkich 1. Theproverstrategycan be implemented inprobabilisticpolynomta time given oracle access to tke originalproverstate~y, 2. The completenesserroris exponentailly vanishing, andin case the original proof system has perfect completeness so dots the resulting one.
3. Soundness error is less tkan 2'"*(p+1). 4. For L E NVSZIG: The simulator deviation is at most a polytomialfactor greater tkan the original one.
The transformation
Fix a language L in 3tYSZK or HVC2iClrM and let (Jf, 11) be the proof system guaranteed by Lemma 3.1. Let T = ~(9)) be the number of rounds of (kf, A) and let e = E(n) be the length of A's messages. We may describe this proof system as follows:
' Recall thathonest-verifierzero-I;nowledgeproperticsnr~ prcwvcdunderpmallcl repetition.
Original Proof System (M,A), on input z: 1, In round i (i = 1,2,. . . , T), (a) A chooses a message ai ER { 0, 1)' and sends it to M. ) is Statistical (resp., Computational) Zero-Knowledge, and this zero-knowledgeproperty is exhibited by a black-box simulator. I, In the case of Statistical Zero-Knowledge, the simulator deviation is at most 2-"("1 greater than that of (M, A).
Theorem 3, follows immediately from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1.6 Wcnowinformally explainwhyLemma4.1 holds. Allofthesepropcrtics depend on facts about our Random Selection protocol which will be proven in subsequent sections. Property 1 follows from the fact that our Random Selection Protocol consists of 2 rounds with Merlin sending the last message. Property 2 is clear, given that the Merlin's strategy in the Random Selection protocol can be implemented In probabilistic polynomial time.
Properly 3, the completeness error, follows from the fact that (M, A) hascxponcntiallyvanishingcompletenesserrorandthefact that when M behaves honestly in the Random Selection protocol, the a'5 will hnve only have a statistical difference of 2-"(") from uniform, It is obvious that perfect completeness is preserved by our %x cnso of preanlntion, WC only show how to obtrdn a soundnesserror of I/n. but thlo can be replnced v&h nay inversepolynomiol.
transformation. For soundness (Property 4, we will show that in our Random Selection protocol, a cheating M cannot make the output lie in any set S c (0, 1)' with probability greater that 2" -9 + &. This gives M essentially an extra 2" factor of freedom (compared to what M has) at each stage. Over r stages, we expect M to succeed with probability 2'" times greater than M can. But since the original (M, A) protocol has soundness error 2-(++')", M still has only an exponentially small chance of succeeding. The additive error term of 1/2nr also accumulates to give an additional additive factor of 1/2n to the soundness error over r rounds, yielding a total soundnesserror less than l/n. A more detailed proof of soundness will be given in the full version of the paper [GSV98] .
The proof of zero-knowledgeness(Properties 5 and 6) is the major technical undertaking of the paper, and it too reduces to properties of our Random Selection protocol. We will demonstrate that no matter what strategy the verifier follows, the ai's will be distributed statistically close to uniform. Moreover, we will show that the Random Selection protocol satisfies a strong sbnulability property: Using the verifier algorithm as a black-box subroutine and given a random (Y E (0, l}L, one can efficiently simulate the distribution of Random Selection transcripts which yield (Y. Thus, a simulator for the Transformed Proof System could operate as follows: Run the honest verifier simulator for the original proof system to produce a transcript of ai's and pi's; then use the strong simulator for the Random Selection protocol to "fill in" how the cr;'s are chosen. These intuitive arguments will be made precise in the next few sections.
Random Selection
Let q and4 be any polynomials. In this section, we describe an ArthurMerlin protocol RS,,l(n) = (i&S, ARS)(~) for randomly selecting a string in (0, 1) 'cm). The protocol employs the Random selection protocol DGW,,f(n) = (&, AD) of [DGW94] as a subprotocol, and the following presentation is adapted from that paper.
For notational convenience, we will write q to mean q(la] and L to mean e(n). Let 'If be the space of affine linear functions from (0, 1)' to {0,1}(-, , i.e. h E 31 is of the form h(z) = Az + b for some appropriately sized matrix A and vector b.7 For cr E { 0, 1)'. vfewrite3tofor{h E H:h(cy) = 0). Lets = t-(e-n)+ @-n)andt= s -410g2(3qs). Note that elements of (0, 1)' can be viewed as elements from 31. The protocol DGW,,f utilizes a space of functions T from (0, 1)' to (0, 1): satisfying the following properties:
1. Each f E T has a description of size poly(n).
2. There is a poly(n)-time algorithm that, on input f E 7 and h E (0, 1}5, outputs f(h). 3. There is a poly(n)-time algorithm that, on input f E T, y E {O,1}',listsalltheelementsoff-'(y). Inparticular.If"(y)1~ p(n) for some polynomial p. 4. For every y E (0, 1)' and f E 3, f-'(y) is nonempty. 5. 3 is a family of almost s-wise independent hashing functions inthefollowingsense: Foreverys distinctpointshl, . . . , h, E ((0, 1)' \ (0, l}tOs-*), for a uniformly chosen f E 3, the random variables f&l), . . . , f(hS) areindependentlyanduniformly distributed in (0, 1)'. QIis property is used only for tbe proof of the soundnesscondition of the protocol, found in [DGW94].)
'Any 2-universal family for which the required compuratioos are feasible can be used; we use his particular family for simplicity and ease of presentation.
An esplicit construction of such a family is given in [DGW94] . We can view each f E 7 as defining a partition of { 0, 1)' into 2t cells of the form f-'(y). each of size poly(a). For notational convenience, we will sometimes write cell y to refer to the cell f-' (,y).
We now describe the protocol of [DG\V94]:
The DGW Random Selection Protocol DGFVV,,e = (MD, AD)(~):
1. AD selects f ER F, and sends it to MD (i.e., AD selects a random partition). 2. lrf~ se1ect.s y ER (0, I}', and sends it to AD (i.e., & uniformly selects a cell). 3. AD selects k ER f-'(y) (i.e. AD uniformly selects an element of the cell). 4. output k.
If, at any step, AD or & do not select an object from the appropriate set, whatever message they zend is interpreted as a canonical element of that set. In [DGW94] . it was shown that the above protocol has the following properties (roughly speaking):
I. (Soundness) For any Merlin strategy kfs, the output distribution on 7-l = (0, 1)' of (@,, AD) deviates from uniform by at most l/q (in statistical difference). 2. (Simulability) Let A& be any strategy for Arthur. At least a l/poly(n) fraction of the h's in (0,l)" occur as possible outputs of the interaction (3fD, A&) and given such an h, one can simulate in poly(n)-time AL's view of an interaction resulting in h.
Themainhindranceinapplyingtheprotocol asusedby [DC&V941 is that the simulator is only guaranteed to work for a l/polg(n) fraction of the h's. The new technique of this paper is to interpret the output k E 7i of the DGW protocol as a set of strings (namely k" (O)), from which a single string Q is randomly selected by Merlin. It is this cy, rather than k, that is the output of the Random Selection protocol. Thus, we only need to simulate the Random Selection protocol for a random o' rather than a random k. For a given a, there are esponentially many hash functions k such that k(a) = 0. Because this space of k's is so large and covers the (Y'S near-uniformly, we are able to perform the simulation for a 1 -2-n(") fraction of the ~8s.
A full description of our Random Selection protocol follot.vs.
Our Random Selection Protocol RS,,e = (AIRS, ARS)(~):
1-3. AS in DGS?',,e(a).
AIRS sekcts Q ER k-'(O). (If h-'(O) = 8 then (Y is defined to be Oe.) 5. output (Y.
As with the DGW protoco1, if AM or i&7 do not seIect an object from the appropriate set at any step, whatever message they send is interpreted as a canonical element of that set. The properties of this protoco1 are described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Foranypolynonials q and.t', the Random Selection protocolRS,,e isa 2-roundprotocolwith thefollowingproperties:
1. (&@ciency) Both 41~s and ARS can be implementedin time poly(a) and the protocol is public-coin for both parties. The (Y'S are included in the outputs of Distributions 0 and (lI) above to force the simulator to produce a transcript for an externally speczjied (Y (rather than an LY which it generates on its own while producing the transcript.) Proof: Efficiency is immediate from the description of the protocol and the properties of the families T and H. For Soundness, let ni;is be any cheating Merlin strategy and consider an cxecution of the protocol (M &, ARS). Notice that that the probability that the output (Y lies in some set S is bounded above by the probability that h" (0) contains an element of S. Now, for lb chosen uniformly from X (instead of by the protocol), the probability that h-l (0) contains an element of S is at most In our protocol, h is chosen using the DGW protocol. It shown in [DGW94, Prop. l] that a cheating Merlin can cause at most a l/q statistical difference from the uniform distribution on H, and so the Soundness property follows.
We now describe the simulator which will be used to establish Strong Simulability. Recall that p is polynomial bound on the size of f"(y) for any f E F, s is the description length for elements of 7& and functions in 7 map (0, 1}3 to (0, 1)'. where 1 = 8 -4 1% (W.
The simulator Si$, on input CY E {O,l}', proceeds as follows:
Sl. Let f E 3 be the first message sent by A& S2. Repeat the following up to a -2(3sq)4 -p times:
(a) Chooseh'uniformlyfromti, (RecallthatT&, = {h: Is(rw) = 01. (b) Let y = f(h') (i.e., y is the cell containing ib'). Compute k %r If-'(y) 17 X,1. With probability 1 -$., proceed to next iteration of Step S2. S3. If the simulator failed to produce output so far, output fniL eThe restriction to deterministic Arthur strategies is only for WC of prcrmtation, ns n simulator for randomized Arthur strategies can uniformly select und fix kthur'o coinsondthenuse thesimulator for deterministicstrategies. What wo uso!ho Random Selection simulator us tt subroutine in the simulator for tho Transformed Protocol In Section 6, the coins of Arthur will have already been fixed by the outer simulator.
"In Section 1.1, we defined theVerifier's view to consist of his rnndomcoins and theProver'smessages. Here.wedonotinchtdemndomcohts,ns thcynreitrclnvantfor deterministic stmtegies. We also include Arthur's messages -this 19 unncrcssary i13 they are functions of Merlin's messages, but it will be convenient for our prc:cntn!lon.
From the various properties of the families F and H, such as the fact that f-'(v) can be enumerated in time poly(n), and the fact lhat o, q, and p are ail poiy(n), we see immediately that the nmning Lime of S$P is poly(n).
Let ua now show that Distributions (I) and (II) in Proposition 1 havcatatioticnidiffcrcnce2'"~"~. Eachproducesoutputoftheform ((f, v, h, (w) , IX), In both cases, f is the (deterministically chosen) first message of Ahs and 1/ = f(h), so it suffices to show that the distributions restricted to their (h, a) components are statistically close, We therefore define the Distributions (I') and (II') to be the Distributions (I) and (II) restricted to their (h, cr) components. To analyze lhese distributions, we make use of the following Lemma, the proof of which is in Section 7. (As statedin the introduction, we can nloo prove n much more general form of this lemma. The proof in omitted in this abstract.) When we apply the lemma, we take 1' = e -n, E = 2-". and S = {A&(y): 21 E {O,l)t}. In other words, S is the set all possible cell representatives that Ahs can send in Step 3 of the protocol (Mno, Ahs), Notice that 6 d!' ,!!ii. = 2' = 2-4 lwa(3w) IN 2 and so, c e #6-c = 2'*("). Now, observe that the protocol (Mno, Ais) selects h uniformly from S. (Recall that A%, is deterministic,) Thus, Distribution (I') is exactly Distribution (A) of Lemma 5.1. Now we will show that the Distribution (II') is statistically close to Distribution 03).
Let uu consider n single iteration of Step S2 in Sj$. In such an itemlion, h' is chosen uniformly from 7f,, and y = f(h'). We write .f('&) to denote the set of images of elements of 'H, underf (Le,, f(7L) = {f(h): h E ti,)). In otherwords, f('?L) istheset of ceils intersecting tia, We want to establish that the distribution oP R'a produced by the simulator will be uniform in S n N,. In order for this to happen, v must be uniformly selected from f(K). IP f wns chosen honestly by A&, we would expect it to be one-toone on the set 'IL, since ?i, is a vanishingly small fraction of the domain, However, f is chosen adversarially, so we must do some work to ensure uniformity:
Notice that for any ~0 E f(7&), the probability that f(h') = yo whenuniformly selectingh' E '?&, isexacUy~3C,~f-'(~~)~/~3Cal. In §tcpX!b, anysuchchoiceis maintained with probability l/IX& f"'(uo)l, Thus the probability that v = go after Steps S2aandS2b fn Sns la exactly 1/17Ll. Th is is independent of ~0, and therefore y is n uniformly chosen element of f(K) -that is, a uniformly chosen ceil intersecting 'Ha, (These probabilities sum up to lfW4l/l%l. h' h w IC may be less than 1; this is due to the possibility that the iteration ends prematurely in Step S2b.) Now, since, in Step S2c, h = A;&) is taken to be the representative of cell y, the function h is uniformly distributed over the representatives of cells which intersect %. In Step S2d, we abandon any h not in 7-L. so the resulting distribution on h is uniform over cell representatives in H,. that is, uniform over Sn7-L. Thus a single iteration of the loop produces an h uniformly chosen from S n Ho, if it manages to produce output at all. This is identical to how h is chosen in Distribution (B) of Lemma 5.1. So, to show that the Distribution (II') is statistically close to Distribution (B), we need only to show that the probability that the repeat loop fails to produce output in all its poly(n) iterations is 2-*("I for at leasst a 1 -2-*("I fraction of the a's in (0, l}L. We do this by showing that each iteration produces output with probability at least R times the reciprocal of the number of iterations.
There are Wfo places in which an iteration can be exited, causing it to fail to produce output -Steps S2b and S2d. Observe that the simulator never exits in Step S2d if h' chosen in Step S2a lies in S, because then h will equal h'. This occurs with probability IS n '&l/l7f,l. By Lemma 5.1, for at least a 1 -2-"("1 fraction of a E (0, l}L, this quantity is at least 6/2 = l/2(330)'. Now suppose that h' has been chosen in S. The probability of not exiting in Step S2b is at least l/If-'(y)I, which is at least l/p by the properties of the family 7. Thus, for a l-2-*(") fraction of the CT'S, a single iteration produces output with probability at least 1/(2(3sq)4 -p). Since there are (2(3sq)' -p) + n iterations, output is produced with probability 1 -2-"("I.
We have shown that Distribution (I') is identical to Distribution (A) in Lemma 5.1 and Distribution (II') has a statistical difference of 2-*(") from Distribution (B). So, by Lemma 5.1. we conclude that Distributions (I) and (II) have statistical difference 2'"(") and Strong Simulability is established. n 6 Simulating the Transformed Protocol
In this section, we describe the simulator for the protocol (M, A) of Section 4. Let S be the simulator for the honest verifier in the original protocol (M, A). We will give a universal simulator S for (M, A) which uses any verifier strategy A* as a black-box.
The simulator S**, on input z:
1. Uniformly choose and fix random coins c for A' to obtain a deterministic strategy A(l). 2. Run the original honest-verifier simulator to obtain a transcript (cyI,/% ,..., %Pr)+-S(z). 3. For i = 1 to r, do the following:
(a) Run the strong simulator for the Random Selection protocol, on input ai with Arthur strategy A('). to obtain a simulated transcript ii of the Random Selection pmtoco1 (i.e., t. + S&' (aj)). (b) L.et A('+') be the state of A(') after additional history ti, ai, Pi. 4. Output(tl,al,pl,...,t,,crr,~r;c). To prove that the above simulator has the desired properties, we firstconsiderits output distribution in the casethattbe original honestverifier simulator S is perfect: Let s^' be the output distribution of SA. if the output of S in Step 2 is replaced with a true sample (a&,..., (rr, &) of the protocol (hf, A). By an induction argument using the strong simulability property of the Random Selection protocol, it is easy to show the following: . Claim 6.1 sA (x) and (AI, A*)(Z) huve statistical dtfirenceat most 2-n(n).
The proof of Claim 6.1 can be found in the full version of the paper [GSVgS] . Now we deduce Lemma 4.1, Parts 5 and 6, from Claim 6.1.
Statistical Zero-Knowledge. UsingtheoutputofSinsteadofa true sample from (111, A) can increase the simulator deviation by at most &S(Z)-(,!I, A)(x)l[, h' h !! IC is exactly the simulator deviation for the protocol (~11, A).
Computational Zero-Knowledge. We claim that the probabilityensemblesX1 dgf {@$A')(E)}~,zL andX2 Sf {SA*(x)}& are computationally indistinguishable for any probabilistic polynomialtime A*. ConsidertheensembleXa d&f {sA* (z))%~L. ByClaim6.1, XI and Xa are statistically closeand therefore computationally indistinguishable. We claim that Xi and X3 are computationally indistinguishable,foranyprobabilisticpolynomial-timeA*. This holds becauseanydistinguisherD between,& andXa can betransformed into adistinguisher D' between {(III, A)(z))~~L and {S(Z)~~~~L, which arecomputationallyindistinguishableby hypothesis. Thenew distinguisher D' operates as follows: Given a transcript 2' of either of the latter two ensembles, perform the procedure specified by SA* , replacing the execution in Step 2 with T, and feed the output of 3'. to D. When T is selected according to {(Al-, A)(z):[~EL, D is fed with ensemble X3, whereas when T is selected according to {q~))sEL, D is fed with ensemble X2.
Remark. The above proof actually shows that, for any (not just probabilistic polynomial-time) verifier A*, if (M, A*) and SA* can be distin_&shed by algorithm D, then there is an algorithm no more powerful than A* and D (i.e., a probabilistic polynomial time machine with oracle access to A" and D) that can distinguish the original honest-verifier proof system (ill, A) from its simulator S. So:ifthehonest-verifiersimulatorproducestranscripts indistinguishable from (U, A) by any machine running in, say, quasi-polynomial time, then the new protocol (M, A) is zero-knowledge against all quasi-polynomial time verifiers.
Proof of Hashing lemma
Here we provide a proof of the Hashing Lemma used to establish the main result of this paper. We restate the lemma here: Proof: We define a per&t hash function h E 7i to be one of the form h(x) = Ax + b, where the matrix A is full rank @nd hence h is surjective). Note that a straightforward calculation shows that at most an E fraction of the functions in H are not perfect. We first establish Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma for the special case of perfect hash functions. it suffices to considersets C such that H 1 f . From the definition of A, we observe:
where the last equality is due to our assumption that every lr E S is perfect, and hence Ih-'(O)I = l/e. To analyze the expressionabove, which refers to a sum over I& f S, we first consider the behaviour of the sum over all h E 'Ii, Here, we can use Chebyshev's inequality. Consider the probability space uniform over H, and define, for every 2 E C, an indicator mndom variable:
xr ( where the last inequality is because ICI 1 IDl/2. Since ## 2 6, we can apply the above to the probability space uniform over S nnd conclude, Recall,
Pr LAX E q = -!-c WC(h). IS( heS Note that this value has no dependence on h. Hence, for every x, given Ax = x, the distribution AN is uniform over {h E S : h(x) = 0), Note that for all x, given Bx = x, B'H is also uniform over lhc same set. Thus, conditioned on the value of x, the dlolrlbutions An and Bn are identical.
Hcncc IlA -Bll = [IAx cstnblishcd, 1
-BX ]I 5 ~1, and the sublemma is Before WC argue Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma in general, we will show how Part 2 follows from Sublemma 7.2. In the sequel, it will be convenient to introduce the following notation: For any Gbnct I C 'I& we will write L to denote the set {h E I : h(x) = ' In order to apply Sublemma7.2, we will considerthesubsets' C S of all pcrfcct hash functions in S. Since less than an E fraction of all hnshfunctionsnrcnotperfect, IS'1 2 (l- Thus, where the last equality follows from E -IDI = ITI and ITI * I%.] = Iti]. Using the fact that 11$/ 1 (1 -f) -H, we have, for a (1 -&i) fraction of x E D.
Note that the final inequality follows becausewe can safely assume that ,/Zi + i < 3. This is because we can freely assume that c . ,llq-c < 1, since otherwise the statement of the Hashing Lemma becomes trivially satisfied. Since &+ $ is upperboundedby H -#S-k for someconstant k, our assumption can be made to imply that fi + 5 < $ by choosing c > 2L. H Finally, we establish Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma in general by showing that the presence of imperfect hash functions will not disturb our computations. First, we see immediately that since IS'] 2 (1 -f)]S], the statistical difference behveen A and A' can be at most f. To see that the statistical difference between B' and B is sufficrently small, it suffices to show that for almost alI x, the probability that Bn outputs an imperfect hash function, given that BX = x, is small. First we argue: 
